University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1952

The Cooperative Defense of Europe
Covey T. Oliver

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Oliver, Covey T., "The Cooperative Defense of Europe" (1952). Minnesota Law Review. 1055.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1055

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

MINNESOTA

LAW REVIEW
Journal of the State Bar Association
JUNE, 1952

VOLUME 36

No. 7

THE COOPERATIVE DEFENSE OF EUROPE*
COVEY

I.

T.

OLIVER**

THE PROBLEM

T

HIS PAPER is one of a series falling under the general topic,
"Some Contemporary Problems in Foreign Affairs."' Its objective is to describe and evaluate key developments arising out of
the European defense effort, in so far as they bear upon or have
influenced the nature of the legal order of life in Western Europe.
The problem is to state the interactions between defense and supranational political organization in a European context. The tremendous amount of activity bearing upon this problem and the rapidity
with which events have moved are in themselves justification for the
selection of the topic and, incidentally, for the state of semi-"onedownness" 2 of its assignee, bedeviled by time-lag 3 and an almost
indecent acceleration of tempo in 1952. It is perhaps noteworthy
that the subject of this paper and the general topic on which it
bears were selected by a group of international law professors as of
possible general interest at a law professors' meeting. This may
mean either that lawmen are widening the scope of their interest
to "non-law" fields, where they will be modest, helpful co-workers
with other professional specialists, or that once more they will

*This article is the substance of an address delivered by the author at
the International Law round table at the 1951 annual meeting of the Asso-

ciation of American Law Schools in Denver, Colorado, modified, however,
to take into account a number of significant developments in the area it deals
with since the date of its first presentation.
**Professor of Law, University of California School of Law (Berkeley).

1. This was the over-all topic of the round table referred to. Other
papers in the series were Bishop, The Structure of FederalPower over Foreign Affairs, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 299 (1952) ; and Re, The Nationalization of
Foreign-Owned Property,id. at 323.

2. Acknowledgment to Potter, Lifesmanship (1950).

3. At this writing no primary source giving the text of the draft of the
European Army Treaty can be found in any of several libraries on the campus of a first-class university. Reliance on secondary materials has had to
be greater than the author would have wished.
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assume a Superman posture and in their fancy, but not in reality,
take over the operation. My "pitch" will be toward the first possibility and against the second, and in the process there may be some
tossing of jurisprudential crockery.
II. AN ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION
In a nutshell my thesis is that today the big problems of cooperative defense and of European supra-national governmental
institutions are precisely the same: organizational and chiefly
political.
The stage of panic after Korea regarding Soviet intentions in
Europe has passed. A new phase has begun. The wave of panic
did many things. It changed the basic nature of the North Atlantic
Pact from an alliance which would discourage an aggressor by
making it clear that an attack on one would be an attack on all,4 to
a mechanism for putting armies-in-being in the path of the potential
aggressor. This shift, initiated by France,5 resulted in American
proposals regarding the use of Western Germany's power which
staggered the French and, eventually, led, as the resultant of vectors
of conflicting appraisals, to the concept of the European Defense
Community and to many an important development in connection
with the negotiation of the "peace contract" between Western Germany and the Western world. The fear of imminent Soviet movements westward also shifted the emphasis of American aid to Europe
heavily toward armaments and away from economic assistance. 6
The best evidence that the stage of panic has passed comes from
the fact that our press no longer frightens us, as it did in the winter
of 1950-51, with the spectre of 175 Soviet divisions or of the
formidable East German "police" force. Instead the pundits tell
4. Although the treaty provided for mutual aid, both the Secretary of
State and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1949 emphasized that
its chief function was to prevent any potential aggressor from taking a calculated risk that he could divide and conquer. See the Report of the Secretary, Dep't State Bull. 532-536 (April 24, 1949) ; Report of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, Senate Executive Report No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(June 6, 1949).
5. James Reston, New York Times (March 2, 1952) states that France,
alarmed by the implications of Korea, on August 5 and August 17, 1950,
took the diplomatic initiative which led to the step-up in American military
aid to Europe and in the sending cf additional American forces there. This
development is to be contrasted with the popular assumption of the time
that Europe was sanguine and only America had the wind up.
6. The metamorphosis of the Economic Cooperation Administration into
the Mutual Security Administration and a shift to a ratio of about 5:1 in
military to non-military assistance in the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (65
Stat. c. 479; Pub. L. No. 165, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.) set a trend which has continued.
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us their highly placed sources say that NATO strength on the
Hamburg-Trieste line exceeds the Russian, that supply lines have
been re-oriented so as to run across France, roughly perpendicular
to the front, rather than through the more vulnerable Hanseatic
ports; that the U. S. Sixth Fleet, plus the entry of Greece and
Turkey into NATO, virtually assure the Mediterranean. It is admitted that the North Sea approaches are less well protected, that
Soviet submarines are a menace and that the air picture might be
better. But, overall, the consensus seems to be that counter-powerin-being now exists on such a scale as to make extremely hazardous
7
to the potential aggressor any move by him.
It is significant, perhaps even curious, that public attitudes do
not seem to have been appreciably affected for any of the NATO
countries by this change in the power relationships in the area
of immediate contact. A columnist here or there may mention the
"embarrassment" of our Pentagon planners lest too much be made
of this shift, but, by and large, leadership and the public in the
NATO world still accept the policy that calls for a build-up of force
in order to create that "situation of strength" which must, according
to the currently accepted official hypothesis, exist before there
may be the possibility of any effective negotiation with the Soviet
Union.8 This situation probably only proves that the NATO public
is more sophisticated and tougher-minded than some commentators
give it credit for being. It may realize that strength on the lines is
only the first phase of military security.
However, the atmosphere in which the cooperative defense of
Europe develops cannot be insulated from the important development described above. With the passing of panic it is to be expected that the pace along certain lines will be more deliberate, the
planning more detailed, the bargaining sharper, and national political issues less easily sublimated. These shifts in attitude will inevitably reflect themselves in problems of organization and of
politics; hence my thesis under this heading.
By way of carrying forward the presentation and at the same
7. Testimony read for General of the Army Eisenhower in executive
session and made public on national wire services about May 7, 1952, supports this at the highest professional level.

8. Cf. Kennan, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, Foreign Affairs, XXV,

No. 4, 566-82 (July, 1947). This thesis, elaborated more and more away
from Mir. Kennan's concept of the struggle as one of "over-all worth," toward
physical concepts of containment, has been stated as the Administration's
position many times.
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time of making a semantic clarification, however, it should be noted
that in this sense "political" does not, if it ever should, exclude
"economic." The basic economic problem of European defense is
highly political, both nationally and internationally, for it is a
bugetary problem. Between NATO countries it is the problem of
allocating defense costs on the basis of ability to pay. Within France
it is the question of effective and fair tax administration. As to
France internationally it may involve further examination of her Far
and Middle Eastern involvements. In Britain it is in part the question of state-furnished welfare versus defense; it may in larger part
warn of more serious international trade problems just beginning to
be recognized for what they are. It may even reflect a species of isolationism.9 On the other hand, it may be said that currently and over
the shorter range the economic aspects of the common defense effort
make fewer demands for our attention than do those which relate
to the operation of the machinery created to have, or actually
having, something to do with that effort. For instance, the Schuman
Plan will not have very significant, immediate economic consequences. The multilateral treaty setting up the Coal and Steel Community provides for "preliminary" and "transitional" stages. That
during a period of production crisis, when every kilo of steel which
can be produced, efficiently or inefficiently, is needed, it is difficult
indeed to predict when the economic consequences, in the sense of
the rationalization of industry, etc., of the Schuman Plan will begin. Its political consequences, however, which its originators never
belittled, are with us.
III.

THE ISSUES OF ORGANIZATION

The European scene today seems as bewildering to the casual
follower of international activities as New Deal I "alphabet
soup" was to Al Smith. Certainly it must be painful to practical administrators, as well as to lovers of the "true" [or good oldfashioned, bilateral] diplomacyY' It is amazing that a Europe
which, despite advice over some time from Americans, did not think
seriously of supra-national organization [except of the conqueror's
universalist state variety] until it received M. Briand's proposal
in 1930, should in so short a time since the last war have created
so many institutions which seem to be designed to go 'round like
9. Mr. Bevan and the Labor "left-wingers" have been so called.
10. The sort of thing Mr. Kennan sighs for. Cf. Kennan, American
Diplomacy 1900-1950, 72, 93-94 (1951).
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pieces of government. The problem of coordinating the work of
these various institutions is already difficult, sometimes nearly out
of control, and may get worse before, if ever, it gets better. This,
basically, is the problem of organization. It deserves closer attention.
To overstate the matter, let us consider the alternatives before
a Frenchman holding a policy-making position in the Direction des
Accords Techniques at the Quay d'Orsay. A matter comes up, say
about coal movements by Rhine barges. We need not specify the
precise question. With what institutions should he deal? Through
diplomatic channels with the other national governments concerned? With the Economic Commission for Europe (an agency
of the United Nations Economic and Social Council), with what
is left of the Office of European Economic Cooperation (the European aspect of the administration of Marshall Plan Assistance),",
with the Zone Commander in Germany, with the Property or the
Economic Section of the Allied High Commission, with the International Authority for the Ruhr, with the Coal and Steel Community, with the European Defense Community? Does the Council
of Europe at Strasbourg figure in the resolution of his problem?
If so, does it involve the Strasbourg Assembly or the Committee
of Ministers? Perchance there may be an aspect which would
concern the European Payments Union. Or, should the French
element at SHAPE take the matter up? Or, does it go somewhere else in the NATO organization? When we add the possibility that the United Nations General Assembly might be meeting in Paris at the time and may have several more avenues open for
use in connection with the particular problem, the time has come
to draw the curtain on our hypothetical French friend, knowing
that, although he may have had a bad quarter hour deciding, it
can safely be assumed that out of the multitudes at hand he will
settle upon the modality which seems best to serve the national
interests of France. 12
In order to know where Europe is organizationally it will be
necessary to examine the functions of several of the institutions
11.

For its past glories, see Surrey, The Ecomic Cooperation Act

of 1948, 36 Calif. L. Rev. 509, 514, 540 (1948). For its probable sad fate,
see Vendetta in Downing Street, Economist, 79 (April 12, 1952).

12. How France, or any other country, decides what is really its
national interest is, of course, another matter on which exponents of a current vogue fail to enlighten. Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, et al. My
contribution to a forthcoming Festschrift in honor of Hans Kelsen, to be
published by the University of California Press, addresses itself in part to
the teachings of this school.
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mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The opportunity for a
contribution along these lines here has been reduced, and with it
the wordage of the paper, by the recent publication in another
Review of a most excellent study of the institutions of Western
European union."
The Council of Europe, meeting at Strasbourg, was the semiofficial product of a private movement for European union, strongly
supported in intellectual circles and by a nucleus of significant
European political figures.1 4 It may be said to be the parliamentary
approach to European organization. The Council is perhaps best
described as a shadow plan for a European Parliament. It is a
shadow plan because the Consultative Assembly, its lower house, is,
as was the General Assembly of the United Nations prior to
the adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution (and still is, in
the strict wording of the Charter), 5 a recommending and not an
acting body. Moreover, as has been pointed out,"6 popular election of delegates to the Consultative Assembly has not been
achieved, with the result that the national parliamentarians who
make up its membership represent very little more than themselves. The Assembly has been and continues to be the forum
through which the further development of European government
can be discussed, except that as things presently stand, the As7
sembly cannot debate military and defense matters.'
The Council of Europe could, hence, be put off to one side, with
further brief reference to the restrictive power which its upper
house, the Committee of Ministers (foreign ministers of members),
has as a result of its being the exclusive conduit through which the
several European states can be put under a duty to consider nationally what the Assembly has recommended, were it not for the fact
that the functions of the Council in connection with the Schuman
Plan and the European Army Plan persist as a topic of current
serious discussion. The Committee of Ministers has already rejected one Assembly proposal to convert the Council into a European Parliament of delegated powers. But in August 1951 the Com13. Loewenstein, The Union of Western Europe: Illusion and RealityI. An Appraisal of the Methods, 52 Col. L. Rev. 55 (1952).
14. Id. at 55-66.
15. See Kelsen, Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations,
A Supplement to The Law of the United Nations, Ch. 4 (1951).
16. Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 68-69.
17. However, Mr. Winston Churchill proposed a unified European
Army at the August, 1950, session of the Consultative Assembly, and his
proposal
was1951)
adopted.
"1
(Sept. 15,
[Vol.American
I. No. 2G].Committee on United Europe News Letter
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mittee of Ministers made procedural changes looking to the possibility that the Schuman and European Army plans might come
within the framework of the Council, even though some members
of the Council (notably Britain and the Scandinavian countries)
will not be participants in either plan. This was achieved by the
device of permitting departure from the rule of unanimity in instances where it has been unanimously decided that a group of
members less than all should consider action along particular lines.
The move had three aspects: (1) it suggested a formula of which
Britain might avail herself to stay in the Council; (2) it gave a
partial Council considerably better chances of obligating the participating governments to consider Assembly recommendations;
and (3) the possibilities for using the Council to coordinate the
Schuman and European Army Plans were improved.
The development was built upon the Consultative Assembly at
its December 1951 session, where proposals were adopted and referred to the Ministers providing for the redrafting of the Statute
of the Council to provide it with an executive by making the High
Authorities [executive branches] of the Schuman and European
Army Plans a part of the Council machinery. In this way the
Council would get delegated powers, for the High Authorities, as
will be described below, have authority to act within the scope
of the powers given to them by mutual consent of the participating
countries, subject to removal if censured by the appropriate Assembly. Provision was made for keeping the liaison channel
supplied by the Council open as between members of the Council
participating in particular programs and those which are not.
This proposal brought about a British counter-proposal, made
by Mr. Eden to the Committee of Ministers in March 1952. The
Eden Plan is apparently aimed at preventing the Council from becoming so much an operator of plans in which Britain will not participate that it could not serve any longer as the channel for contact between Britain and the Continent on matters of mutual interest, such as defense and coal, iron and steel production. In response to Labor questioning in Commons,' Mr. Eden has stated
that his Plan differed from the Assembly proposal in that it did
not work any change in the present advisory functions of the
Council; it was designed "to associate the Council of Europe practically with the work of the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community." The gist of the British proposal is thus modeled
18. The Times (March 25, 1952) ; News Chronicle (March 25, 1952).
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upon the August 1951 action of the Ministers: the Council will
function on a limited, six-power basis when it is providing the "institutional structure of the continental functional consolidations"; it
will meet on a full, fifteen-power basis when it serves "as the
organization for inter-governmental cooperation in Western Europe
and for the promotion of European unity in the broad sense."'"
The proposal, and the seemingly favorable response it has received, indicate that the Council of Europe, whose future appeared
-°
so bleak to a qualified observer writing only a few months ago,2
may have greater viability than had been thought. Certainly the circumstances and utterances surrounding the British proposal indicate
(1) a view that duplication should be avoided and coordination
achieved; (2) British desire to use the Council as the channel for
defense cooperation with the continent, rather than relying entirely
upon NATO; (3) the absence of any real impediment to giving the
Council real powers in its sbc power aspect.2 1 The Strasbourg
shadow government, hence, is sufficiently valuable to British interests that Britain does not wish to see it fogged out by frustration
or to have it become even more shadowy, as it would if a continental
Political Authority were established at another place. That the
Council has this much value to its least ardent member may give it a
new lease on life and increase remarkably its chances for evolving
into a supra-national, continental government of limited powers,
with which Britain would have peculiarly British ties, being, as it
were, "of but not in" the resulting European power structure.
The other institutions listed in the case of the hypothetical bewildered Frenchman by and large differ from the Council of Europe
in that they fall more easily under the rubic of "functionalism." This
has no particular significance to Americans, but to Europeans and
Britons, affected by the growing pains of European union, "federalism" and "functionalism" are emotive words, loaded with semantic
significance.22 So seriously are the philosophic differences taken
that we find a French delegate at the December 1951 meeting of
the Assembly at Strasbourg saying in support of the proposal
for modification of the Statute, discussed above:
"The Federalists cannot ob;ect to it, because their ideals are being
the others, because it is in fact a functional
served. Nor
'23 can
approach.
19. Mim. 103/2, British Information Services (March 24, 1952).
20. Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 78-79.
21. But see text infra, p. 812-813.
22. Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 56-57.
23. Europe Today and Tomorrow, International Bulletin of the European
Movement 27 (Jan. 1952).
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Essentially the idea of functionalism is that European union will be
the end process of a number of power shifts, particularly in the
economic field. In general, the British call themselves functionalists,
but they might be termed "even more so" functionalists because they
are chary of tossing their powers into the power-shifting machine
and tend to doubt the desirability of any detailed, written charting
of new power arrangements, at least in so far as Britain would be involved. The official French are the "less so" functionalists if, indeed,
they are still so classifiable at all. That supposed marvel of functionalism, the Schuman Plan, became each day in Fench hands
more and more a fulcrum to move Europe into a federal union.
In the French version of the European Army Plan it was even
more difficult to find that functionalist flavor paramount. Too sharp
a focus along such lines here blurs the background behind the
economic or military central image. Over the shorter haul, the
great significance of the Schuman Plan will not be its economic
effects, as we have seen above. Its political implications are really
of greater immediate importance. Obviously the cessions of national
sovereignty involved are the dramatic headliners, but the amount
of government-like machinery set up to deal with the power shifted
may be more important.
This is not the place for a detailed description of the civics of
the European Coal and Steel Community. Suffice it to say that it
has three branches of government: an executive (the High Authority), a bicameral legislature (the Assembly and the Council of
Ministers), and a Court of Justice. The government is one of
delegated powers with respect to economic activity in the production
and distribution of the coal, iron and steel resources of the participating countries. On paper these states yield their sovereign
powers over these commodities to the supra-national organization.
Key institution in the organization is the High Authority, a plural
executive chosen initially from a panel of qualified technicians by
the participating countries and serving six-year terms, with elaborate provisions after the first six-year period for the transition of
power to the Authority itself each year to fill one of the two positions
vacated. The Authority is given the power to act directly on the
basis of the authority yielded in the multilateral treaty creating the
Community, subject to the following checks:
(1) Once a year the High Authority must report on its operations to the Assembly. By two-thirds vote the Assembly may bring
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about the resignation of the Authority and may then replace it with
another body of experts.
(2) The Council of Ministers, which was engrafted onto the
original French proposal to meet fears of the Low Countries, consists of representatives of the member states. Its function is stated
by Andr6 Philip as follows:
"Although it is not empowered in any sense to control the
High Authority, those of the latter's decisions which have, or
may be expected to have, important repercussions on the general
economy can only be taken with the concurrence of the Council.
In times of crisis, of boom and slump, as generally with decisions
affecting the economy of a country as a whole, the Council will
have power to intervene. Thus, the allocation of raw materials
in time of scarcity would involve the Council, and in such
periods the High Authority would act officially as its partner,
and in effect, probably as its agent. But the Council (unlike its
counterpart at Strasbourg) cannot take decisions without the
Authority's consent.... .. [Italics added.]
(3) The Court of Justice is an administrative court of the continental type. It is open for the claims of the member states, the
Council, and private concerns, that the Authority has misinterpreted
or misapplied, or failed to apply, the treaty. The Court can declare
void a decision of the High Authority and make it pay damages. It
can also compel the High Authority to act where the treaty creates
the duty to act or the Court finds an abuse of power.
The Council appoints a Consultative Committee, equally representative of workers, consumers and producers, with which the
High Authority may consult whenever it wishes and must do so
when the treaty specifically requires it.
Writing in June, 1951 before the August and December, 1951,
developments at Strasbourg previously outlined, M. Philip, after
pointing out that the Schuman Plan Assembly is to be made up of
78 representatives, either directly elected or chosen by the Parliaments of the participating countries, adds:
"A protocol to the treaty provides that these representatives
be chosen from among the delegates of these Parliaments represented in the Strasbourg Assembly, and that they should be
called upon to make annual reports to the latter. If the Strasbourg Assembly could manage to revise its Statute and emerge
from the 'consultative' to the 'legislative' stage, the Schuman
ProducPlan Assembly would probably become the Industrial
25
tion Committee of the Strasbourg Assembly."
24. Philip, The Schuman Plan: Nucleus of a European Community 18
(1951).

25. Id. at 16.
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The possibilities for fitting together various pieces of supranational government through the instrumentality of the Council
of Europe thus suggested have not been lost sight of by the Council,
as we have seen.
There may be a point to a comparison between such a centralized,
supra-national structure of specifically delegated powers and what
we Americans usually think of as a federal government: The executive (the High Authority) would draw its specific, operational
powers directly from the constitution (the multilateral treaty). The
legislature would be a check on the executive, either by the removal
process (Assembly) or the veto process under certain conditions
(Council). The court would have the final word on what the constitution requires, prohibits or does not authorize. Mr. Eden's answer to the Laborite question must, then, have referred to the immunity Britain would have, because she is not subject to the High
Authority, under his plan for giving the Council of Europe a dual
role. If he meant to deny that the High Authority could bind participating countries if it becomes a part of the Council, coordination
through the Strasbourg channel will simply be impossible and
action will.take place elsewhere, through another institution of
which Britain might not be a member.
The European Army Plan, shaped in rough outline by the hammer of American insistence that Western Germany's military
potential be effectively organized for defensive use on the somewhat
malleable anvil of French fears about taking chances that Germany
might once again become capable of independent military action,
passed first inspection by the NATO countries at the Libson meeting in February 1952, was then machined at Paris by the six
continental countries directly concerned, and is now up for sale to
a number of national parliaments. The European Defense Community, as the European Army Plan is now called, will be established along lines very similar to those developed for the European
Coal and Steel Community.28 Just as the Schuman Plan was the
core idea of the latter, the Pleven Plan is of the European Defense
26. At this writing, May 10, 1952, perhaps even at the hour, the Treaty
is being signed at Paris. It is possible that details as to organization will be

somewhat different from what is mentioned in this paper, which has been
prepared on the basis of periodical, and interested group publications. The
most useful single source has been The Economist 531-532 (March 1, 1952).
The Ecowomist pictures a power-structure in which the High Commission

will be even more subject to the control of the Committee of Ministers than
I have sketched in the main body of the article. This may reflect newer
developments during the recent negotiations or a more bearish appraisal of
the same developments my other sources had in mind.
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Community. The Plevin Plan is obviously modeled after the Schuman Plan, with provision for almost identical institutions and
for the use of the same Assembly personnel with, again, an opening for the Strasbourg Assembly to supply them. The general
pattern for the pooling of particular resources (here manpower
and industrial defense potential) and the cession of sovereignty
to the High Authority is repeated. In the European Defense
Community the plural executive would be, in effect, a European
defense ministry for the participating countries. But the defense
ministry would have some of the functions of other ministries,
such as those of economics, budget, heavy industry and manpower as well for, in the words of Secretary Acheson: "The
European Defense Community will include not only ground, naval
and air forces but economic and political institutions."' - It seems
clear, also, that the Defense Community will have closer ties
with the NATO structure than will the Coal and Steel Community.
The Final Communique of the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council declares on this point:
"... It also agreed on the principles which should govern
the relationship between the proposed community and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Council
agreed to propose to its members and to the European Defense
Community reciprocal security undertaking between the members of the two organizations. . . . All these decisions were
inspired by the conviction that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Defense Community have a common objective, to strengthen the defense of the Atlantic area,
and that the development of the European Defense Community
should be carried forward in this spirit. Therefore, the Council
considered that the obligations and relationships between the
communities should be based on the concept of two closely
is
related organizations, one working, so far as this objective '28
concerned, within the framework of and reinforcing the other.
The fact that Western Germany has not been invited to join NATO
but is to be a member of the European Defense Community will
undoubtedly tend in the same direction, not only for reasons of
effective administration, but also because the European Army Plan
is, at present writing, the only possible conduit through which Germany could be given an "'associate membership" in the Atlantic
29
alliance.
It seems likely, also, that within the power structure of the
27. Acheson, Review of Accomplishnents at Lisbon, 26 Dep't State
Bull. 363, 365 (March 10, 1952) [No. 663].
28. Id. at 367.
29. See text infra, p. 817-818.
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European Defense Community its Council of Ministers will loom
larger more immediately even than the similar body for the European Coal and Steel Community, if for no other reason than that
the questions which will face the Defense Community are graver,
more immediate and therefore more apt to create greater reluctance
to actual transfer of sovereignty. In fact, it was suggested in an interim report prepared in July 1951 by experts meeting under NATO
auspices,30 that during a transitional period the institutions of the new
Community should delegate responsibilities to national authorities,
only assuming them directly when institutionally able to do so.
It is known, moreover, that the Low Countries have been relatively
reluctant in the past to the merger of national forces into a new,
supra-national force, in contrast with the French, who have insisted
upon the concept of loss of national identity for fear of the emergence
of a German national force. The Low Countries have also been
reluctant to agree to a common budget for the European Army. 31
Strengthening the Council of Ministers, de jure or de facto, at the
expense of the High Authority seems, on the basis of the Schuman
Plan negotiations, the probable outcome of this conflict of national
viewpoints; and by this same route, if not by some other, Germany
may find satisfaction with respect to her claim that German participation must be on a basis of equality.
The outsome of the Lisbon session of the North Atlantic
Council raises a rather difficult question as to the place of NATO
in the structure of supra-national government. It was technically
correct to say as of the time this paper was read32 that NATO
was not a governmental structure33 and so should be sharply differentiated from the other institutions under examination. Such a
statement would be based upon a legal analysis showing that NATO
was created by a multilateral treaty for mutual defense as an instrumentality or specialized channel through which the contracting
sovereignties could pursue their common interests in self-defense. It
30. American Committee on United Europe News Letter 3 (Sept. 15,
1951). Although it is difficult to be certain from the scanty information at
hand, it would appear that NATO was something more than a catalyst in.
the preparation of this interim report. If true, this tends to confirm certain
of my suggestions as to future relationships between the two institutions.
31. Sulzberger, New York Times (December 16; 1951).
32. Prior to the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council.
33. "Infrastructure," that piece of NATO gobbledegook, we may leave
where Secretary Acheson did in his report on the Lisbon meeting: "One
thing I can't explain to you is how these facilities [airfields, ports, headquarters and other supporting installations] came to be called by the name
of 'infrastructure' But despite this heavy handicap, good progress was made
on this issue too." Dep't State Bull. 363, 365 (March 10, 1952) [No. 663].
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could be called nothing more than the arranging part of a regional
arrangement. 34 As of this writing, however, it might not be entirely
absurd to say that NATO really may be well along the evolutionary
path toward de facto governmenthood, widening out from a central
core of responsibility and power in the military field into broader
areas of administration, both functionally and geographically. If
there is anything to this, the functionalists, not the federalists, will
have a victory to claim, and among the functionalists the British,
with their dislike of government by written plan and their predilection for living by ways they have grown into, will have the greater
cause for satisfaction. The facts which might support this hypothesis are:
(1) NATO is the official channel through which American,
British and continental defensive strength will be mobilized and applied. NATO seems presently to meet the requirements of a
Principle of Effectiveness,35 and this effectiveness is shown in some
rather significant ways. A good example is the broad powers of
investigation and recommendation given to the "Three Wise
Men," as the Temporary Council Committee has been popularly
called, to pry into the intimacies of each member country's economic
and financial structure, for tie purpose of fixing goals within
overall capacity and to allocate burdens on the basis of ability
to pay. Another is the recent appointment by the United States
of a single individual to be both its chief dispenser of funds to
Europe and its top representative on the new Permanent Council
of NATO. Still another, impcrtant to technicians, at least, is the
shift at the Lisbon session of considerably more responsibility over
troop dispositions, equipment allocations, and rate of call-up to
the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE),
NATO's command structure." It may even be relevant in this
connection that at Lisbon the United States agreed to some measure
of group review of its own defense budget. 37
34. A term in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter which very
much offends Professor Kelsen's sense of semantic precision, see Kelsen, Re-

cent Trends in the Law of the United Nations 919 (1951), but which most

diplomatists and any Frenchman would think a most useful term indeed l
35. With apologies to Professor Kelsen for a possible distortion of his
concept, see Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 121 (1945).
36. See Reston, New York Times (March 2, 1952) for an excellent
survey of the growth of NATO from its inception through the Lisbon
session.
37. Hoffman, New York Times (Feb. 23, 1952) reported: "The United
States has agreed to submit its military budget to an annual review by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, along with the military budgets of the
other Atlantic powers. The purpose of this joint review is to agree on priori-
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(2) At Lisbon NATO acquired a structure not dissimilar from
that of the United Nations Secretariat, in contrast to its rather
diffused, discontinuous organization prior to that time. In the words
of the Final Communique:
"The Council also took action to adapt the Treaty Organization to the needs arising from the development of its activities
from the planning to the operational stage. The North Atlantic
Council, while continuing to hold periodic ministerial meetings,
will henceforth function in permanent session through the appointment of permanent representatives.The Council decided to
appoint a Secretary General, who will head a unified international secretariatdesigned to assist the Council in the fulfillment
of the increasing responsibilities. All civilian activities of the
organization will be concentratedin the geographical area where
are situated other international agnecies whose work is closely
related to that of the Treaty Organization and with which
close administrative connection is essential to efficiency. These
are presently situated in the vicinity of Paris. When these
changes become effective, the Council will assume the functions
hitherto performed by the Council Deputies, the Defense Production Board, and the Financial and Economic Board."38
[Italics added.]
There is a tightening up here, a putting of the organization on a
continuous, flow-chart basis that may mean something besides just
greater efficiency. The new structure is potentially a very strong executive body. It will be interesting to see, for instance, whether it is
the High Authority of this or that European "community" or the
NATO Council, or its Secretary-General, which becomes the real
"operator," not only with respect to the over-all of defense, but as to
matters actually falling within the treaty-given jurisdiction of the
European "communities."
(3) Despite Mr. Eden's conciliatory gesture toward the Council of Europe at Strasbourg, a usually competent, if trenchant, observer, The Economist, has said of the British position:
"... NATO is now the British Government's favorite organization, and its coming enlargement and translation to
Paris were seized upon as an opportunity to give a coup de grace
to OEEC, which was to be cut to ribbons....
"... Most of the Europeans who have knowlege of interties for defense expenditures so that first things can be done first." The
same report states that the Temporary Council Committee, whose adopted
report contained the provision for annual budgetary review, also recommended
an annual review of requirement and production targets by the newly created
continuing organization. The Final Communique contains language which
would cover such agreements but does not specify them. See 26 Dep't State
Bull. 369 (March 10, 1952) [No. 663].

38. Id. at 367-368.
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national affairs, and almost all the Americans in Europe, 30 believe that the British Foreign Office for reasons of its own has
' 4
sworn a vendetta against all forms of European cooperation."
It remains to be seen whether The Economist's somewhat lurid
vendetta theory will prove to be correct in its pessimistic prediction
that no good regarding European organization, as distinguished,
perhaps, from Atlantic organization or simply an unusually efficiently administered military alliance, will come from the recent proposal
of the Foreign Secretary. Other observers, however, have seen
NATO emerging, not merely to rival continental supra-national
organizations, but the United Nations itself. Starting from an inarticulated premise that the United States foreign policy has used
the United Nations Organization in an entirely instrumental way,
moving away from it prior to Korea, shifting back to it for the
Korean crisis, an observer at Lake Success 41 reports that delegates
there know that public opinion in the United States and in the
other free countries concerned gives the primary role to NATO and
discounts the new mechanics for undoing the veto provided in the
42
Uniting for Peace Resolution.
The other European institutions mentioned in the case of the
baffled Gaul require, really, very little discussion in the context of
this study. They are, principally, power-aiding and not power-controlling devices. The Economic Commission for Europe is principally useful as a research center and for rather sporadic and no
longer very significant economic contact between the Soviet orbit
and the Wrest. The OEEC may or may not come to have a function
in connection with the new NATO structure, but if not absorbed
it will shrink and become vestigial with the shift from economic to
military aid. The "Peace Contract" with Germany, accelerated and
further liberalized by the zeitaeist regarding the need of Germany,
will certainly reduce to a minimum the authority of the Allied
occupation, on both a zonal and a combined basis. An Anglo-American assist to the Schuman Plan4 3 and the "Peace Contract" together
will kill off the International Authority for the Ruhr. The European
is not a supraPayments Union, as Loewenstein has said, "...
39. A ploy? See Potter, Lifesmanship, Passim (1950).

40.
41.
42.
Kelsen,

The Economist 79-80 (April 12, 1952).
Hamilton, New York Times (April 27, 1952).
General Assembly Resolution of November 3, 1950, analyzed in
Recent Trends in the Law of the United Nations, Ch. 4 (1951).

43. Western Germany has been assured that with the coming into force
of the Schuman Plan Treaty the International Authority for the Ruhr will
be discontinued. 8th Quarterly Report of the U. S. High Commissioner for
Germany 27 (July 1-September 30. 1951) ; Loewenstein, supra note 13. at 93.
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national organization with immediate enforcement powers." 4 It is
a "hot rod" clearing arrangement, with multi-speeds forward, reverse and sideways. Customs unions, such as Benelux, Francita,
Finebel and Uniscan, are still on paper, despite much talk. Only
Luxembourg and Belgium have such an arrangement working, and
it is not quite a new thing.
In brief review, then, we see that the problem of organization
has moved rather rapidly away from what seemed to be one of
dealing with a confusingly large number of institutions, each with
rather specific functions, creating, principally, difficulties as to
analyzing particular problems in terms of the appropriate agency
to handle it and of overall coordination. What has the problem
moved towards? It is submitted that it has moved in the direction
of concentrating supra-national functions, in so far as the continent
is concerned, through the instrumentality of the Council of Europe,
to which Britain will have a peculiarly British tie and the United
States through NATO a single European institution with which
to carry on co-defense operations. It is apt to be the Committees
of Ministers, however, or their special deputies 45 for the Council of
Europe, rather than the technicians on the High Authorities, who
will really possess the supra-national executive power. There is,
however, the possibility that the vaster powers of a new-model
NATO will prove too great for the emerging continental organization and that it will suffer one of the fates of institutions which never
get, or lose, power: wither away, become a symbolic ghost of a popular ideal, or decline to the level of a mere instrument to be used
when national interest dictates. If NATO itself gets the nod of History, the possibilities seem to be a new type Grand Alliance, the
beginnings of a defacto Atlantic Government, or the first of a possible
series of regional substitutes for, or managing agents of, the United
Nations with regard to its fundamental, or peace-keeping, function.

IV. THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS
As we have seen, there is now substantial evidence that the or44. Id. at 84.
45. At its December, 1951, session the Consultative Assembly recommended to the Committee of Ministers that each of the member states be asked
to appoint a minister to be specially responsible for European affairs, such
ministers to meet at regular intervals and act as substitutes for the ministers
of foreign affairs, so that the Committee of Ministers [of the Council of
Europe] could become an organ for semi-permanent consultation, Europe
Today and Tomorrow 24 (Dec.-Jan. 1951-52). The French Government,
by Decree of January 30, 1952. has created a new cabinet position of Minister of State for Council of Europe Affairs and an interdepartmental committee of the French Cabinet for his direction as to policy. Europe Today
and Tomorrow 27 (Feb. 1952).
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ganizational alternatives for the power-structure of cooperative defense have narrowed down, become clearer and, therefore, the more
fundamental. Political problems have had a parallel evolution; so
that today a number of issues regarding political attitudes and their
bearing upon the situation may be disregarded as no longer of
primary importance. 6 The political issues have also become the
more fateful as they have winnowed down. The major political
problems which will be examined here are: (1) the problem of
British aloofness from participation in continental supra-national
organizations and (2) the problem of whether a reliable German
orientation toward a cooperative role in the Western defense
system can be developed and maintained.
It is perhaps a little provincial to cast the first problem in terms
of British aloofness. It might just as unfairly be called the problem
of French illusions about Western European federalism or the
problem of American enthusiasm for the others to unite. But in
truth it is the British reticence about joining in continental proposals for supra-national organization that has created the greater
uncertainty, and therefore the greater difficulties, both in the immediate past and presently. It is, also, more the current, non-Soviet
enigma wrapped in a mystery. As to France it is not hard to see
the institutional logic behind the ideal: by creating a community
stronger than the potentially dangerous member, that member
may be put into a power situation where he cannot cause trouble...
and, in time, he may even be reformed-Q.E.D. Nor do we have
to puzzle about the Americar.. attitude. General Eisenhower's call
for a "constitutional convention ''47 by its very choice of words so
clearly reveals one reason for it: Toynbee's "mimesis," 43 if not some
Founding-Father image. Moreover, the Principles of Good Administration and even the National Interest point the same way,
most Americans seem to think.
But what are the British after? What do they really want? Is
their attitude based, but secretly, upon the Balance of Power, that
bastion of the old diplomacy? Are there enough "little Englanders"
to carry a type of isolation to the point of insanity? Or is Britain out
46. As Western Germany approaches sovereignty, for instance, a number
of the dissatisfactions of European countries not participating in the occupation have tended to disappear. Also, Western European countries occupied
and damaged by Germany during the war have, on the whole, ceased to be
concerned about reparations expectations dashed by shifts in American policy.
47. Does this also connote an American preference for the federalist
Approach? Cf. text mtpra, p. 802.
48. A Study of History, Somerville Abridgement 278 (1947).

COOPERATIVE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

to build herself up as the third force in NATO, giving nothing to
the United States when it comes to keeping national individuality?
Or is Britain dreaming of the Anglo-American coalition of World
War II ? Is Atlantic Union her goal? Is it that those who stood alone
so steadfastly that terrible year not too long ago cannot have faith
in the continent when the chips are down and therefore must remain on the ready to hold out, but this time not alone? How valid
is the well-worn, "We are part of a world-wide Commonwealth."
record? Do the Commonwealth countries really oppose closer ties
between the United Kingdom and the Continent? Would Canada,
for instance? Australia? New Zealand? If they do, what is the
difference to them whether Britain gets herself tied into European
affairs through NATO or through some other channel?"' There is
little available upon which to select among these possibilities and
others previously mentioned. 50 We can only, at this time, note some
of the principal problems created by the uncertainty and pick out
trends.
On the whole France seems to have adjusted rather realistically
after her first and second wavess' of disappointment regarding the
British position. The equanimity with which British non-participation in the Schuman Plan appears now to be accepted may be partial
proof of the estimate given above as to its probable economic effects
over the shorter haul and in the present crisis. The French now
appear to be willing to hope for the best from Britain-in-Europe
and to take what they can get, including, if possible, British guarantees against the dangers of Germany-in-Europe. British aloofness
has observable effects, however, with respect to the attitudes of the
Low Countries on particular issues of European political unification.
To some degree it must be related to the absence of the NATO
Scandinavians from the European Defense Community. British
aloofness to continental goals for European organization is also,
of course, a very great factor in estimating the viability of the
planned institutions in relationship to NATO and will have its
effect, too, in the direction of the latter's evolution.
The German Problem, in its present phase, touches vitally
almost every other aspect of this inquiry. Western attitudes toward
49. Cf. The Commonwealth and NATO, The Economist 519 (March 1,
1952).
50. See text supra, p. 801-802.
51. The second wave, of course, came when after the Conservative
return to power in Britain no discernible re-orientation of British policy
toward supra-national European organization occurred, despite Mr. Churchill's leadership as a private citizen in the European Movement and at Strasbourg.
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Germany, particularly the American, have shifted so dramatically
as to give us, perhaps, History's classic case of events outgrowing
agreements and also, to him who would trace them out, illuminating
examples of the methods, "legal" and otherwise, by which states
proceed, in such circumstances, to re-adjust. It is somewhat striking
that in such a situation as this the only question which appears to
have been treated extensively on the basis of legal doctrine is only
secondarily related to basic problems: Did the German state survive
the act of unconditional surrender?52 The basic assumptions upon
which a Western reparations agreement was entered into were
altered to the point of negating the principle that Germany should
pay further reparations. But this was not achieved as the result
of any argument as to the nature of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus; it was required to get the Marshall Plan through the American
Congress, and France and other Western European claimants had
to accept it.5 3 Contrary to President Wilson's rather prim opposition to the resort by the United States in the conduct of its foreign
affairs to any doctrine of substantial breach by the other party,"4 the
Western Powers, under American leadership, have based each
of their moves (pacing, of course, Soviet moves in Eastern Germany), from Bizonal Fusion, through the formation of German
economic agencies, the creation of the West German Republic,
and the re-arming of Germans, upon a rather un-technical and not
too precise version of such a doctrine.5 5 The Soviet Union has not
bothered to justify here departures in this way; she just says the
Western Powers are in breach, period. I am not moralizing. It is
just to point out, at what seems an appropriate place in the analysis,
52. For the latest words on fiis legal issue which Kelsen first raised,
see Wright, The Status of Germany and the Peace Proclamation, 46 Am. J.
Int'l L. 299, passh (1952).
53. This is a subjective statement. As far as I know the involved history
of the successive shifts in American nolicy regarding reparation from Germany
and Japan remains to be written. As to Germany, see Clay, Decision in Germany 322-325 (1950). The point here is that these shifts were based entirely
upon political and economic considerations, domestic and international, without any significant invocation of legal doctrine.
54. President Wilson to Secretary Lansing, May 8, 1917, 1918 For.
Rel., Supp. 2, pp. 170-171: "I do not feel that Germany's playing fast and
loose with the obligations of this treaty [Treaty of 1799 between the United
States and Prussia], as of all others, affords for us who are proud to observe
obligations and would like to set an example, a sufficient ground for repudiating our own promises under it." See also, V Hackworth's Digest of
International Law 342-348 (1943).
55. It can hardly be said that suspension for prior breach, see Harvard
Research in International Law, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 653, 1089-1090
(1935) as distinguished from termination for prior breach, adequately covers
irretrievable departures from the earlier Quadripartite Ageements on what
Germany would be prohibited from doing.
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that in the struggle for Germany technical doctrine has been relatively little used, even in an emotive or argumentative way, and
the traditional international legal institutions not at all.
It is interesting to speculate at this point on the semantics of the
term "peace contract," used with official care to designate the settlement between the three Western Occupying Powers and Germany.
Legally, what is the difference between a "peace contract" and a
treaty, of peace? Assuming for the question that the United Nations
Declaration of January 1, 1942,56 prohibited a separate peace, what
is gained by the senantic shift? It is suggested that the shift
obscures nothing relevant to the East-lVest struggle and was not
intended to; rather that it was chosen to adjust orthodox legal concepts to Germany's continued division and the resultant need for
keeping residual occupation powers under a drastically watereddown occupation statute. If this is correct, it is the hard facts that
have created the new legal symbol, not the legal symbol that controls operations with respect to those facts.5 7 If the plan goes through,
there will be legal problems, certainly. Courts will have to decide
what kind of an international animal Germany is, and so on; but
the law will follow after, it will not shape beforehand. Whether,
as the ferment of internal German politics presses the Western
Powers to more relaxations in Germany's favor, anything will
be made by Germans to the Powers' embarrasment of the fact
that ex-enemy Japan got a "treaty" instead of a mere "peace contract" is not too clear, although some of the demands now being
heard for full German sovereignty seem to have this flavor.
The crucial doubt affecting the collective defense of Europe is as
to the reliability of Western Germany as a member of the group.
The problem has two aspects: (1) The orientation itself, will it
stick? (2) Will Germany in such a context keep her place or run
56. Paragraph (2) of the Declaration reads: "(2) Each Government

pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not

to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies." Dept. of State
publication 1732, Executive Agreement Series 236, 1; A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Sen. Doc. No. 123, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949).
It is legally arguable, on grounds of treaty interpretation, that "peace" here
meant "cessation of fighting" and that the whole objective of the Declaration was to do what could be done to prevent some anti-axis country doing
what the revolutionary Russian regime did in 1917-stop fighting Germans
and make a "peace" while hostilities continued.
57. The emotive and dialectial use of legal symbolism is a fact of life.
Mr. Kennan seems inexplicably blind (for a diplomatist), in his indictment of a "legalistic-moralistic" orientation of American foreign policy
as the cause of our major foreign policy blunders of this century. He seems to
take as actual shapers and limiters of our policy the concepts in which it
is clothed for presentation! See Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950,
Ch. VI (1951).
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the show; i.e., how good are the protective devices against German domination of the emprise for her own national ends?
The first aspect of the problem presents the Unity Issue. Developments since this paper was read have certainly proved the
prediction then made: the poker game for Germany is on for fair
and it is going to be tight poker, played close to the vest and with
no pot limits. The pattern of Soviet conduct in the face of the
Western acceptance, indeed insistence, on a return of Germans to
uniform and of Western German factories to defense-supporting
production, has run consistently along three avenues: (a) the actual
build-up of cat's-paw power in captive East Germany; (b) repeated warnings to the Western Occupying Powers, cast in diplomatese indicating extreme seriousness, such as that the Soviet
Union will not "tolerate"' 8 the re-arming of Western Germany;
and (c) the dangling of progressively more enticing unity carrots
before the noses of the West Germans. The latter development, in
turn, has led to the present stage of the game: both sides are for
German unity and a restoration of German sovereignty. They
differ on the techniques for getting there, and the West has not
offered Germany a completely free hand with respect to rearmament,
which the Soviets, drawing with customary casuistry on a Japanese
Peace Treaty they opposed, have. On the other hand, the Soviet
Union has not offered Germany a collective immunity from Communist coups or the Eastern Territories.
And what do the West Germans do? Observers have seen in the
conduct of Chancellor Adenauer a rhythm with respect to Allied restrictions of resigned acceptance, then internal political opposition
to the restrictions from which the Chancellor is careful never to
completely isolate himself, followed by the deposit of the dilemma
on High Commission laps, and, finally, the return in triumph with
the relaxation thus won.5" This is not necessarily sinister or dangerous. In fact, there are few indeed who doubt the genuineness of
the present West German Gdvernment's determination to throw in
with the West and become Good Europeans. It is cited simply
to show the pattern of Germany's re-acquisition of power and to
high-light that the same technique can be and is being used on a
58. The texts of the severz.l Soviet notes to the West about WestGerman re-armament during the past year are not available to me. I understand there is some question whether "tolerate" is quite the proper transla
tion of the Russian warning term. Commentators seem agreed, however,
that the terminology used usually indicates something more than mere displeasure.
59. The Reporter (May 13, 1952), gives a remarkable helpful picture
of the Adenauer cycle of battering down Tripartite restrictions on Germany.
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broader front. No German Government, obviously, can turn its back
on possibilities for achieving German unity; and, too, differences
between the Four Powers over the medium for supervising allGerman elections cannot be used very effectively in internal German politics. Therefore, political needs in Western Germany have
dictated the obvious German counter-position: unity without restoration of the Eastern Territories is illusory. Again, here it is the
good fortune of the Germans that those who struggle for their
favor, including the USSR, must be continually under compulsion
to give them back the national power position they once had. The
Soviets have an ace in this poker game. Only they can give back
the Eastern Territories. The Soviets have made some plays that
must have involved hard choices in the Kremlin, but they have
not yet slipped their ace off the bottom of the deck. If pressed, will
they do it, or will they find the cost too great and shift emphasis to
avenues back to (a) or (b) above? If they do play it, will any
Western German Government be able to refuse to pay the price
to see the card. It will cost West Germans at least non-participation
in the collective defense of Western Europe and at the most orientation Eastwards, with neutralization and a free hand lying in between.
Thus it is seen that the unity issue in Germany will affect profoundly the whole matter of the collective defense of Europe. The
realities of German power also stand out. It is sobering and amazing that Germany, utterly defeated, divided, occupied, has still the
same dangerous capacity for oscillating between East and West
to her power advantage that she has shown so well too often before.
This observation brings us to the second aspect of the German
Problem in relationship to the cooperative defense of Europe: If
Germany does remain in the new western governmental machinery,
will she keep the place in it which has been marked out for her? To
the extent that the place is not as good as that of any other member
state the answer has already been given in the consistent chorus
from Germany for "equality." So far this chant has been confined principally to the use of German manpower in the defense
effort. If other countries have national armies Germany should
have them. This is the reason the Pleven Plan provides carefully
that all forces of the member states will be automatically transferred
to the Defense Community, except those in overseas territories,
United Nations actions (Korea) and police-gendarmerie. There
is still reluctance (though presumably not based upon the legal
dubiousness of German membership under the Regional Arrange-
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ments provisions of the tnited Nations Charter) 6 ° to having
Germany in the North Atlantic Treaty Community. Result: the
European Defense Community is tied closely to NATO in the
hope that "equality" sufficient to satisfy the Germans can thus be
created. There are echoes from Germany that this is not enough.
"Equality" is a pretty elastic concept. Germany's history has itself
shown the grim truth of the late George Orwell's famous: "All
animals are equal, but some are more equal than others."'6t
Assuming that "equality" demands are satisfied in one way or
another, how then can France and other invasion grounds of past
German aggression be sure that certain German natural advantages
will not tip too far the delicate balances of power written into the
Schuman Plan and Army Plan treaties? We Americans know
how hard it is to be modest about power.6 2 Can we expect that a
sense of self-restraint, a denia of national advantages, will mark
German conduct in the new structures, granting the most peaceful
of intentions and the genuineness of a Westward orientation? How,
within the Schuman Plan, will the precious uniqueness of Ruhr
coking coal manifest itself? In the Army Plan will the ratio of
French to German groupments 3 hold, considering population factors and the drain of French manpower to Indo-China? It is a
matter of observation that French leadership in the making of
the proposals has taken into account these and other power-factors
favorable to Germany and that the institutions on paper reflect certain mechanisms designed to counter-balance it.64 But that does

60. Under Article 107 of the Charter the use of force against an enemy
state in World War II is an exception to the rule that force cannot be
used except under United Nations auspices. Also, there is a question whether
a state not a member of the United Nations may be a member of a "regional
arrangement" authorized by Art. 51 (2) of the Charter. This raises a legal

doubt as to whether a treaty which provides that an attack upon a nonmember (of the United Nations) might properly be regarded by members
as an attack upon them, squares with the Charter. See Kelsen, Recent Trends
in the Law of the United Nations, Ch. 1 (1951). Italy, also an ex-enemy,
is in NATO.
61. Animal Farm 112 (1946).
62. There is evidence from time to time that certain of our legislators
still have not seen that there might be leadership advantages in such modesty,
especially when the power concerned is that of the purse.
63. Apparently a newly coined technical term to replace "division,"
which probably connoted too much along the lines of German general officer
organization to suit the French.
64. I have a historical hunch that the Schuman Plan idea may have
begun within the French Government as a device to keep German power
within bounds. After it became apparent to the French that Congressional
sentiment would not permit the carrying out of the reparations approach to
the control of German power, there was a period of time in 1948-49 when
French officials were more than toying with the idea of approaching the
problem through the concentrated voting of French minority stock holdings
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not remove the power-factors from the picture. They will still be
there to put stresses and strains on the carefully engineered structure.
How do we deal with such portentous realities? Are we to
throw up our hands, recoil in horror,6 5 say that moral values and
legal machinery are illusory and hence, bad things ?6" Or must we,
in full knowledge and unblinkingly, appraise the need for continuing the development of stronger values and broader-based
institutions to cope with the problem? The answer to me seems
67
obvious, but not to all.

VI.

WHERE Do LAW AND THE LAWMXEN FIT IN?

It seems to me that sometimes lawmen, both teachers and practitioners, more so than other professional people, such as economists,
political scientists and administrators,6 8 are too quixotically immodest about their role in the power process we know as government. In part this is a good thing, for it shows that lawmen are
not shut in by their professional ethos 69 from the social action
in German industrial enterprises. The inapplicability of the techniques of

managerial control in such a politically-sensitive situation being rather obvious, might not the idea of supra-national, public control have taken its
place? This is sheerest speculation.
65. In his Symbols of Government (1935), Thurman Arnold pokes
not-too-gentle fun at the propensity of social technicians to recoil in horror
from the sort of social chancre that, if it were physical, a physician, holding
his nose, perhaps, would lance. The disparaging contrast is worth remembering
every decade or so.
66. This is what MIr. Kennan is getting himself cited for, whether he
really intended to go this far or not. Support can be found in the interpretations of weekly newsmagazines, newspapers, the house organ of the American
foreign service, foreign affairs study groups, etc., too numerous to cite
here, although in another connection I made a compilation. See, also,
McDougal, Law and Power, 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 102 (1952).
67. Mr. Kennan is vague about his attitude toward the NATO-type
structure. He leaves no doubts, however, about what his attitude toward
the United Nations is, and if NATO is what he has in mind when he speaks
of a "universal 'Article 51' pact," he dings NATO too. His utterance at
this point in his American Diplomacy 1900-1950, 95 (1951) [after a fivechapter analysis of "blunders" in fifty years of American foreign policy,
rather indifferently tied, if at all, when specifically presented, to the thesis
of the quotation] might well be kept in mind as background for the final portion of this paper:
"As you have no doubt surmised, I see the most serious fault of our
past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalisticmoralistic approach to international problems. This approach runs like a red
skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years. It has in it something
of the old emphasis on arbitrarian treaties, something of the Hague Conferences and schemes for universal disarmament, something of the more ambitious American concepts of the role of international law, something of the
League of Nations and the United Nations, something of the Kellogg Pact,
something of the idea of a universal 'Article 51' pact, something of the belief
in World Law and World Government...."
68. I am not thinking of the medical profession at this point.
69. I am thinking somewhat of the medical profession at this point.
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and passion of their times. But it sometimes results in lawmen
being misunderstood/ 0 or actually disliked, by the very people
with whom they should be working. Sometimes, too, it results in
poor jobs being done, as when lawmen work their way into control
of a particularly specialized power process and then proceed to
act like mere lawyers, rather than putting certain broader aspects
of their training, such as manipulative skill with concepts, an ear
for relevance, and even the ability to make-noises-like-an-expertwithout-actually-being-one, to work. Or, what is worse, they carry
the latter skill too far.
Now, it does not seem to me that lawmen act immodestly because
they are vain and puffed up, but rather because they frequently
have very earnest but very exaggerated ideas of what lawmen's
jobs are, and that observation leads us immediately to jurisprudence. Take the problems we have been examining. How much
"law" is there in them? I leave the reader to answer this question
for himself.
The most curious thing to me about an appraisal of what the
various "schools" will say is that the most pro-law and the most
anti-law grbups agree that problems of the sort we have considered
are not "law." Thus, certainly, Professor Kelsen~' would say the
issues are entirely political until the new norms are set out, and
then the law of European organization will be entirely a matter of
grinding out the sub-norms from the more basic norms. Morgenthau
and Kennan would say, I suppose, that the whole development is
simply an operational phase of the pursuit of their national interests
by the particular states concerned. They would deny the whole
concept that new institutions were really created. Hence "law"
in such a context would be ail utter impossibility. To Morgenthau
power, except in the narrow spectrum of power given to the judge
in an adversary proceeding, is the antithesis of law. To Kennan
law is not power but something, which like cloying morality, gets
72
in the way of sound, professional exercise of power .
70. There are passages in Mr. Kennan's book which lead me to believe
that he misunderstood certain of our "non-professional" [diplomat, that is]
Secretaries who were lawmen. See, Kennan, American Diplomacy 19001950, 94 ["diplomacy by dilettantism"], 92 [nice words about Hay, Root,
Hughes and Stimson ... but, like Father. . . they understood very poorly]
(1951).
71. In view of the impressive list of Professor Kelsen's writings relevant
at this point, a single reference is a little inadequate; see, however, Kelsen,
Science and Politics, Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 641, passim (1951).
72. For a more detailed appraisal along these lines, see McDougal,
Law and Power, 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 102-112 (1952).

COOPERATIVE DEFENSE OF EUROPE

Then, returning to writers with reputations in the jurisprudence
of international law, we find Professor Dickinson 73 earnestly pointing to the gap between the pretensions of completeness so often
made for international law and the big holes it contains. Although
hopeful of international organization, Professor Dickinson seems
to be concerned primarily with bolder action on the part of international tribunals, too often content to decide there is no law
and let the issue be so resolved, and, secondarily, with the creation
of more detailed rules of positive law through treaties and codifications.
Professor Jessup, who points out something Mr. Kennan should
have known, 74 pins his faith squarely on the effective growth of
international law through international organization. 75
There is undoubtedly a great deal to what Professor Northrop
has recently said about the significance of the viewpoint associated
with Professor McDougal:
McDougal's observation that not merely British legal
positivism but also American legal realism leave one with a type
of law which is incapable of meeting either the opportunities or
the responsibilities of the contemporary world . . . [is important] ."

For me the trouble with the McDougal substitute for these
inadequacies is that which troubled counsel before Lord Nottingham
in the Duke of Norfolk's case: "Where will you stop?" So far I
have not seen in the writing of Professor McDougal even the selflimitation which Lord Nottingham imposed on himself in his answer
77

to the question.

It is easy and satisfying to agree with Professor McDougal in
his demolition of the Morgenthau-Kennan school.78 I have also
planted charges. Granted that the power process should be broadly,
not narrowly, conceived and that "law" should be regarded as a
variable in the power process; conceded that the variable called
"law" is a decision-making process; the question remains, and I
have never seen Professor McDougal's answer to it: How much
73. Dickinson, International Law: An Inventory, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 506
(1945) ; War and Peace 32-39, 89-105 (1951).
74. That international law has its dialectical uses, such as at the green

table.

75. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, passhn (1946).
76. Northrop, Contemporary Jurisprudence and International Law, 61
Yale L. J. 623 (1952).
77. As Professor Leach tells the tale in one of his inimitable notes,
Future Interests 752 (2d ed. 1940), and probably elsewhere, his Lordship's
answer was: "Whenever any visible inconvenience doth appear." This may
not be quite the right answer to our problem.
78. McDougal, Law and Power, 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 102 et seq. (1952).
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of the decision-making process is sufficiently "law" to be the lawmen's job to do, either functioning internationally as a lawman, or
as an instructor in a law school course? It seems to me this question must be answered for two, reasons:
1. It bears directly on the concern I have expressed about lawmen biting off more than they can chew.
2. As Professor McDougal has said:
"When one's use of 'law' and other words to describe significant variables in the world power process is either so ambiguous or so idiosyncratic as to confuse both himself and others
about the operation of such variables, a community
interest in
179
greater clarity may reasonably be asserted.
By this quotation I do not mean to imply that Professor McDougal is confused. I am. And maybe Mr. Kennan and Mr. Morgenthau and our professional colleagues in other disciplines are also.
Clarification is needed, and lawmen should not accept or be allowed
a monopoly in undertaking it.
79. Id. atlO9, n. 51.

